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Perhaps the greatest challenge currently  facing the Middle East North Africa
(MENA) region is the challenge of creating jobs.  A recent World Bank report
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estimates that some 100 million new jobs will need to be created in the next
two decades to absorb both the current unemployed as well as the rapidly
expanding labor force—more than doubling the current number of jobs today.
If the region is to ensure that this labor force has both sufficient employment
opportunities and the prospects for real wage growth, GDP growth in the
region will need to more than double from its average of 3% per year over the
late 1990s to 6 to 7% a year for a sustained period.  
Making this growth will possibly require a fundamental transformation in
the region, from public sector-dominated economies to private sector-led
economies, open to international trade, with competitive private-sector
industries outside of oil becoming the engine for growth and the creation of
employment.  Supporting a competitive private manufacturing sector in
7
1 Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social Contract.
World Bank, 2003.What impact, if any, have fixed exchange rate regimes had on RER
misalignment and, ultimately, the economic performances in the MENA
region?  In this paper, we calculate the level of exchange rate misalignment
across a panel of countries over the 1970–1999 period, and show that the
MENA region has suffered from substantial exchange rate overvaluation
which, though highest over the 1970–1985 period, has persisted into the
1990s.  It is estimated that over the 1985–1999 period, the degree of
exchange rate overvaluation in MENA averaged some 22%, higher than
for any other region but CFA Africa.  We then calculate the effect that
overvaluation of the exchange rate has had on the competitiveness of non-
oil exports.  It is estimated that the overvaluation of exchange rates has
reduced the region’s manufacturing exports—as a percentage of GDP per
year—by about 18% over the 1970–1999 period.  
Armed with this information, we discuss the empirical relationship
between the extent of exchange rate misalignment and the choice of
exchange rate regime.  From our own calculations, the probability for
fixed exchange rates to become overvalued is substantially higher than
for floating regimes, and the probability for exchange rates under fixed
regimes to become seriously overvalued (in excess of 25%) is almost twice
as high as for flexible arrangements.  We then discuss the reasons behind
MENA’s continued reliance on fixed exchange rate regimes.  While the
exchange rate choices in the region are poorly explained by most traditional
models of exchange rate choice, they in part reflect the interests of the
public sector as both producer of oil and holder of debt, both of which
make the government likely to favor fixed exchange rates over floating
ones. 
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MENA will require action on numerous fronts, including governance,
trade, and monetary and fiscal policy action.  
A requisite component of supporting private sector development in
MENA will be appropriate exchange rate management.  Evaluations of
the economic policies in developing countries have demonstrated the
importance of proper management of the real exchange rate (RER) in a
country’s performance.  Empirical evidence consistently indicates that
best economic performers are those countries that have maintained an
“appropriate” RER.
2
Countries that have properly managed their RER
(avoiding substantial RER appreciation) have been more successful in
promoting manufacturing exports.
3
They have been more successful in
attracting foreign direct investment,
4
and more generally, they have
experienced higher growth.
5
The Middle East and North Africa region has not followed the general
trend worldwide in their choice of exchange rate regimes.  Although over
the past decades, countries have progressively adopted more flexible
exchange rate regimes, the majority of the economies in the Middle East
and North Africa continue to maintain de facto fixed exchange rate regimes.
While about 65% of economies were operating under de facto fixed
exchange rate regimes in 1974 (within MENA, the proportion was
somewhat higher at 77%), by the end of the 1990s, only 42% of economies
outside of MENA had fixed exchange rate systems.  Within MENA,
however, that proportion was 60%.
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2 That is, its equilibrium real exchange rate value (ERER).  See Williamson, 1985; Harberger, 1986; and
Collins, 1997.
3 See Balassa, 1990, for empirical evidence among Sub-Saharan African economies.
4 Goldberg, 1993; Goldberg and Kolstad, 1994; and Cushman, 1985; 1988.
5 Edwards, 1988; Cottani, Cavallo and Khan, 1990; Ghura and Grennes, 1993.risk of macroeconomic collapse, misalignment can hinder economic
growth through a deterioration of domestic and foreign confidence and
investment, and can act as a catalyst for capital flight.
7
Our own estimates suggest that fixed exchange rate regimes are
substantially more likely to become overvalued than flexible regimes.
We  estimated the level of exchange rate misalignment for a panel of
countries, measured as the percent difference between the real
exchange rate (RER) and its equilibrium value (ERER).
8
The RER was
modelled following the approach used by Edwards (1989) and extended
by Elbadawi (1994) and Baffes, Elbadawi and O’Connell (1997).
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From these misalignment estimates, we find that over the 1974–99
period, the proportion of observations under fixed regimes which were
even marginally overvalued was 88%, versus 76% of flexible exchange
rate regimes.  Moreover, the proportion of observations under fixed
regimes which were seriously overvalued (in excess of 25%) was 50%,
almost twice as high as for flexible regimes (28%).  
This tendency for fixed exchange rates to become overvalued has
impacted the MENA region significantly, with substantial overvaluation
of the real exchange rate experienced over the past three decades—
around 29% per year in the ’70s to the mid-80s and 22% per year from
the mid-80s to 1999 (see Table 1 below).  In addition, this tendency has
11
Exchange Rate Management, Overvaluation, and 
the Costs to Competitiveness
MENA’s exchange rate management has relied predominantly upon
rigid exchange rates, though not necessarily “officially” fixed exchange
rates.
6
In part, the reliance on fixed regimes was in response to the rapid
inflation many economies experienced over the late 1980s and early
1990s.  Most economies in MENA opted for a fixed exchange rate regime
as the most effective strategy for combating high inflation. 
This adoption of fixed exchange rates was successful in contributing
to macroeconomic stability.  However, once the immediate threats of high
inflation had been averted, only a handful of countries shifted to more
flexible exchange rate arrangements. 
One of the arguments for countries not contending with high levels of
inflation (and thus not necessarily requiring a monetary anchor) to
adopt flexible exchange rate arrangements is that the real exchange
rate is less likely to become overvalued.  Overvaluation can negatively
affect a country’s economic performance through a variety of channels.
Overvaluation reduces the profitability of tradables and, in turn,
decreases exports.  It leads to a reduction in economic efficiency and a
misallocation of resources.  By increasing uncertainty and raising the
10
6 In many cases of exchange rate systems officially classified as flexible, for example, there has been considerable
“management” of the exchange rate.  De facto exchange rate regimes according to Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger
(2000), determined by looking at the actual behavior of three variables closely related to exchange rate behavior:
exchange rate volatility, volatility of exchange rate changes, and volatility of reserves.  External liabilities and gov-
ernment deposits were netted out from the reserves data, in order to consider only changes with a counterpart in
monetary, an especially important correction for both oil producing countries and countries with large privatiza-
tion programs.  The LYS dataset of exchange rate regimes has subsequently been amended.  This paper’s analy-
sis reflects use of the earlier de facto classification system.
7 In addition to misalignment, variability of the RER has been found to have negative consequences on growth
(Ghura and Grennes, 1993; Grobar, 1993; Cushman, 1993; and Gagnon, 1993).
8 This estimate represents a new contribution to the study of exchange rate policy in MENA countries, since previ-
ous studies are sparse (Domac and Shabsigh, 1999; Mongardini, 1998; Sundararajan, Lazare, and Williams, 1999).
9 This model estimates the RER as a function of both “fundamental” factors in the medium to long-term
(terms of trade, investment, capital flows, and trade openness) and less persistent factors in the short-term
(macroeconomic policies, nominal devaluations and others).  Following the estimation of the RER, the
ERER could be computed.  Using the estimated RER, the ERER was computed by eliminating the effects
of transitory variables and using estimates of “sustainable” values of the fundamentals. Overvaluation and Manufactured Exports
What has been the cost of this greater degree of overvaluation in MENA to
total exports and manufactured exports?  To determine this cost, the following
model tests the effects of RER misalignment and volatility on the logarithm
of total and manufactured exports to GDP (log(Xt )):
ln(Xt ) = c + b1. GDPgrTP i,t + b2. ln(TOTn i,t) + b3. ln(Inv i,t) + b4. ln(Roads i,t)
+ b5. ln(H1 i,t) + b6. RerVol i,t + b7. ln(RerMis i,t) +  t. 
where:
(i) GDPgrTP i,t = the rate of growth of GDP of country’s trading partners
(which can have a “pulling” effect on export growth) 
(ii) ln(TOTn i,t) = logarithm of terms of trade (in which improvements can
increase the profitability of production for export) 
(iii) ln(Inv i,t) = logarithm of investment/GDP (which increases the overall
production capacity, and thereby, export capacity) 
(iv) ln(Roads i,t) = logarithm of length of roads (in km per km
2)
(v) ln(H1i,t) = logarithm of the average number of years of primary
schooling of adult population 
{Both (iv) and (v) capturing the availability of core physical and human
infrastructures}





volatility increasing the uncertainty of export
13
not significantly decreased—contrary to the Latin American, African, or
Asian economies of our sample, which have in general chosen a more
flexible exchange rate regime—with regular devaluation of their
currency—as well as more consequent macroeconomic reforms. 
12
10 Volatility is calculated as the coefficient of variation of the RER over a five-year period.
11 Calculated as the coefficient of variation of the RER over an eight-year period. To compute this indicator,
some economists use more or less sophisticated regressions techniques, such as the variance of the residual
if the regression of the RER on a time trend, or an ARCH modelization RER behavior.  However, from an
empirical point of view, all these various measures are highly correlated and the standard deviation or the
coefficient of variation measures perform as well as more sophisticated ones (see Kenen and Rodrik, 1986 or
Grobar, 1993).
12 In addition to misalignment, variability of the RER has been found to have negative consequences on
growth (Ghura and Grennes, 1993; Grobar, 1993;  Cushman, 1993; and Gagnon, 1993).






































*Depending on the countries. 
1970/80– 84 (in % per year)*                     Misalignment             Volatility
1985–99 (in % per year)*                             Misalignment             Volatility15
profitability)
(vii) RERMis = RER misalignment, as a measure of the distortion of
relative prices (the overvaluation of which hampers competitiveness
and diverts investment out of more productive tradable goods
sectors)
13
The equation was estimated on our panel of 53 countries over 1970/80 to
1999.  The results from our estimation are shown in Table 2.
Our estimations confirm a significant negative impact of ER mismanagement
(in the form of overvaluation) on total and manufacturing export performance.
According to our estimations, a 10%  increase in the level of misalignment
lowers the ratio of manufactured exports to GDP by 7.2%, and the ratio of
total exports to GDP by 1%.  Overall, for the MENA region, this RER
overvaluation during the 1970–99 period reduced—on average per year—
manufacturing exports to GDP by 18%.  
In terms of individual countries in MENA, losses were important in
Jordan and Morocco in the ’70s and ’80s, because of the more diversified
export base of these economies. This is also the case of Tunisia in the ’90s,
despite a low level of overvaluation.  In the major oil-exporting countries
(Algeria and Iran), losses appear small because of the low level of
manufactured exports (Table 3). The large overvaluation, however, has
certainly contributed to the low diversification of these economies. 
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Table 2:  Estimation Results of the Exports Equations 
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NOTE:  Student t statistics are within brackets. The number of observations are 816 and 964. Cointegration of the variables was tested 
using Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) critical values of ADF tests in the case of heterogeneous panel data. (see Table A2 in Annex 2). The 
equations were estimated by using the fixed effect method in the case of manufactured exports and the random effect method in that 
of total exports.
Variable       Manufactured Exports         Total Exports 
13 RER misalignment can also disrupt exports by increasing RER uncertainty. Our measure of RER mis-
alignment comes from our estimation of the ERER (see previous section).Overall, overvaluation represents a large cost to the region.  Developing a
competitive private sector depends upon ensuring appropriate prices.
Profitability of production hinges on prices:  prices of inputs that go into the
production process and the price that can be obtained in the market for
output. Overvaluation damages competitiveness because it artificially alters
the price ratio between tradables and non-tradables, and the region’s
producers of tradable goods find they are less able to compete with either
imported goods or with other countries’ exports.
Economies, which have in reality cost advantages in labor and domestically
produced inputs, begin altering their production processes and substituting
for capital equipment and imported inputs.  And the greater the
overvaluation that takes place, the more difficult it becomes for otherwise
competitive firms to maintain their competitive edge, and the more it
discourages new firms from entering the market. At a time when encouraging
an export-oriented, non-oil private sector in MENA is critical, there is little
room for excessive exchange rate overvaluation.
Exchange Rate Regime Choice
While fixed exchange rates significantly increase the incidence of overvaluation
and subsequently the cost to manufacturing exports, the question emerges,
why does the region continue to rely upon rigid exchange rate
arrangements?  Is misalignment a justified cost that the MENA region must
pay to maintain stability in other macroeconomic fundamentals?  In other
words, have MENA countries been choosing the appropriate exchange rate
arrangements?  
The question is complex.  A great deal of research has been devoted to
17 16





















































































Mis (%)      (%)*      Cost** Mis (%)      (%)*      Cost**
* ExpM:  manufactured exports as percent of total exports
** Cost of overvaluation as percent of total exports
Algeria                         Egypt                         Iran
ExpM*                         ExpM                         ExpM
Mis (%)      (%)*      Cost** Mis (%)      (%)*      Cost** Mis (%)      (%)*      Cost**
Jordan                         Morocco                       Tunisia
ExpM                         ExpM                         ExpM19
improving our understanding of how exchange rate regime choices are made;
two major branches of research emerge.  The first branch has produced
models of exchange rate choice based solely upon economic factors.
14
In this
framework, the optimal regime could be determined as the one that minimizes
fluctuations in output, the price level, or some other macroeconomic
variable.  The other branch of research has focused on the political economy.
While there have been several arguments within this general framework,
they have generally focused on the relationship between domestic political
institutions and exchange rate decisions.
15
But while both economic and political economic models have substantially
improved our understanding of exchange rate choice across countries,
traditional models have been less successful in explaining the de facto
16
exchange rate regime decisions within MENA.  Standard models of
exchange rate choice that incorporate both structural and political
characteristics, when applied to MENA economies, result in incorrectly
predicted exchange rate regimes twice as often as for non-MENA economies.
In Table 4, several conventional models of exchange rate regime choice are
outlined, models which incorporate a broad range of structural and political
18
14 The earliest literature focused strictly on the structural characteristics of the economy, such as economic
openness, country size, and labor mobility.  From these characteristics, the optimal exchange rate arrange-
ment is determined (Dreyer, 1978; Heller, 1978; Holden et al., 1979; Wickman, 1985; Savvides, 1990).
Later research in this branch of the literature has focused on country-specific shocks emanating from both
the international and domestic community (Fischer, 1977; Savvides, 1990).
15 Within that concentration, arguments have centered around policy discipline and credibility (Kydland and
Prescott, 1977), capability and constraints on future governments (Rogowski, 1987; Edwards, 1996).  
16 As opposed to the de jure classification of exchange rate regimes, we have examined the de facto classifi-
cation of exchange rate regimes (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001), which looks at the actual behavior
of three relevant variables to exchange rate behavior: exchange rate volatility, volatility of reserves, and
volatility of exchange rate changes.  This new classification of exchange rate regimes refines the analysis
substantially.
17 Dependent variable exchange rate regime arrangement (1=fixed; 0=floating).  Probit estimation for the
1985–2000 period.
18 SIZE = lagged ratio of GDP in constant US$ to US.  OPENNESS = average ratio of (imports +
exports)/GDP for five years prior to observation year.  CVEX = Coefficient of variation of exports for period
(t-5) to (t-1).  CVGDP = Coefficient of variation of GDP for period (t-5) to (t-1).  CAPCONT = dummy
variable for whether country had controls on movement of capital.  RESERVES = lagged ratio of
international reserves to imports.  INFLAT = average inflation rate over five-year period prior to
observation year.  POLSTABLE= lagged index of political stability (ICRG).  HISTGROW = average lagged
log growth, period (t-5) to (t-1).  All estimations performed over the 1985–2000 period.
19 Exchange rate choice was modeled through probit estimation, with fixed exchange rates having a value of
1, and flexible regimes a value of 0.  Probit estimations will produce a probability of adopting a fixed
regime, ranging from 0 to 1.  A fixed exchange rate regime was said to be correctly predicted if the
estimated probability of adopting a fixed exchange rate regime was greater than 0.6.  A flexible exchange
rate regime was said to be correctly predicted if the estimated probability of adopting a fixed regime was
less than 0.4.  Estimated probabilities between 0.4 and 0.6 were categorized as not definitively predicted
by the model.



















895             37%                        106                16%
895             43%                        106                19%   
674             41%       91                15%
779              42%               97                 17%
Model       Independent Variables
18                No. Obs.     Predictions
19  No. Obs.     Predictions
Non–MENA MENA
% correct % correcttemporary currency appreciation (or depreciation), since by allowing
overvaluation of the currency, the fixed regime permits an at least
temporary reduction in foreign denominated debt payments (albeit while
sacrificing the competitiveness of some national industries in the process).
Continued build-up of further debt, at the same time, allows an overvalued
fixed exchange rate to be maintained, since it permits the government to
continue to borrow foreign currency to sustain the current account deficit
and meet the excess demand.  
In addition, the public sector in many MENA economies (and most
oil-based economies) has interest in its own business, namely the export of
natural resources.  Oil still represents the major source of income and a
dominant source of foreign exchange for the oil-producing economies of
MENA.  Shares of oil in current total exports ranged from a high of more
than 95% in Yemen, to a low of less than 1% in Jordan and Morocco at the
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economy variables.  In none of these standard models are the exchange rate
regimes adopted in MENA as well predicted as for other countries.  In most
cases, the difference in the proportion of observations correctly predicted
between non-MENA economies and MENA economies is substantial.
Where do the standard models fail in predicting the exchange rate
regimes within MENA?  The majority occurs for fixed exchange rate
observations.  Model A, for example, correctly predicts 31% of the MENA
observations of floating regimes.  On the other hand, it does not correctly
predict any fixed regime observations (that compares with Non-MENA
economies, where there were 55% correct predictions for floating regime
observations and 10% correct predictions for fixed regime observations).
Model B correctly predicts 31% of MENA’s floating regime observations, but
only 6% of its fixed regime observations (compared with 57% and 21% for
Non-MENA observations of floating and fixed regimes, respectively).
Overall and especially for the cases where fixed regimes have been adopted,
according to traditional models for exchange rate choice, the MENA region
isn’t getting it right.
Why the MENA countries which would be predicted along structural
variable lines to adopt flexible regimes have chosen to maintain fixed
exchange rate arrangements may have something to do with the public
sector’s personal interests.
Recent research advances on the proposition that countries with high
unhedged foreign currency denominated debt and a correspondingly high
exchange rate risk exposure (such as economies in the MENA region) have
an incentive to peg (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Hausman, Panizza, and
Stein, 2001).  For governments with high publicly guaranteed external debt,
fixed regimes may be preferred as a means to better control the direction of
20
Share of oil in total exports, 1999






















Source:  United Nations COMTRADE data, as reported in WITS trade data warehouse.exchange rates and the potential gains from currency overvaluation (under
control of policy-makers under a fixed regime, at least for the short-term)
rather than the potential for competitiveness. 
In an attempt to understand better the exchange rate regime decisions in
MENA, we estimate exchange rate choice according to traditional models of
exchange rate choice for a large sample of economies, but include public
external debt and the divergent interests of the oil versus manufacturing
sectors.  
The Empirical Results
Several standard exchange rate regime choice models are augmented with
proxies for the importance of oil revenues to the public sector, the importance
of external debt payments to the public sector, and the ability of the
manufacturing sector to lobby the government for flexible regimes.  Debt
payments are measured by the ratio of public external debt to GDP, lagged
one period.  The importance of the oil sector is captured as the value of oil
exports to total exports, lagged one period.  The lobby power of the
manufacturing sector is measured as an interactive between the size of the
manufacturing export sector in GDP and the concentration of manufacturing
exports within the sector, with the expectation that larger or more
concentrated manufacturing sectors (in terms of the industries represented)
are more able to have an effective voice in influencing the government’s
exchange rate regime choice.  The manufacturing lobby variable was also
lagged a period.
Other variables include political stability, size, degree of openness,
measures of external and domestic variability, inflation, reserves, and
23
end of the 1990s.  In 10 of the 16 countries of MENA listed below, oil
revenues account for more than 70% of total export revenues, and in 12 of
the 16, it accounts for more than 45% of export revenue. 
What is striking about oil economies, in general, is the reliance they have
maintained on fixed exchange rate regimes.  For economies in which over
50% of export revenue emanated from natural resource extraction in 1997,
some 83% had fixed exchange rate arrangements in place.  That compares
with fixed exchange rate regimes being adopted in only 38% of economies in
which oil represented less than 25% of exports.  Conventional economic
models approach the desire for fixed or flexible regimes by agglomerating
the interests of the tradable goods sector together.  The problem with this
approach is that the various industries within the exporting sector are
assumed to have concurrent interests.  There is reason to believe this may
not always be the case.
The manufacturing sector, with relatively elastic worldwide demand, is
likely to be more dependent upon competitiveness (and thus, more likely to
lobby for floating exchange rates) than is the natural resources sectors.
Floating exchange rate mechanisms may entail greater short-term volatility,
but better prevent long-term appreciation of the exchange rate.  As a result,
it allows exporters to better achieve external competitiveness through
efficiency, by leaving to the market forces of supply and demand the
exchange rate determination.
On the other hand, the natural resource extraction sector is assumed to
face more inelastic demand and depend less upon imported raw materials.
As a result, currency appreciation has weaker impact on profits (and
depending upon the elasticity of demand, may result in even higher profits).
Thus, the natural resource-exporting sector is likely to prioritize stability in
2225
capital controls.  Annex 3 provides a more detailed explanation of the
variables included in the estimations and the expectations about their
influence on exchange rate regime choice.
To investigate whether the incorporation of additional explanatory
variables significantly improves the predictive power of traditional models
on the exchange rate regime choices within MENA, standard probit models
of exchange rate choice are compared with augmented models (Table 5),
incorporating variables for external debt and for the interests of the oil
sector versus the lobby power of the manufacturing sector.  To avoid
simultaneity problems, the oil sector and manufacturing sector variables are
included in separate estimations.  
By then comparing the predicted exchange rates from the models to the
actual exchange rate choices in MENA and outside of MENA, versus models
incorporating the public sector and manufacturing sector’s interests, it is
possible to measure the improvement of fit.  
24
Table 5:  Standard and Augmented Models of Exchange Rate Choice
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Against the overall trend throughout the world, the majority of the MENA
region has continued to maintain de facto fixed exchange rate arrangements.
Empirical analysis suggests that fixed exchange rates are associated with
greater levels of exchange rate misalignment, in the form of overvaluation,
which, in turn, reduces competitiveness for non-oil exporters.  In MENA,
manufacturing exports—as a percentage of GDP per year—have been
reduced by some 18% over the 1970–1999 period as a result of the region’s
substantial overvaluation of its currency.  At a time when developing a
strong, export-oriented private sector outside of oil is critical in MENA,
there is no room for excessive currency overvaluation.  
We  find that MENA’s choice of exchange rate regimes—predominantly
leaning towards rigid exchange rate arrangements—is less a reflection of
structural characteristics of the economies than it is a reflection of the
political economy.  With a large public sector, which has individual interests
as producer of oil and holder of external debt, the interests of the economy
are often at odds with the interests of the political economy.  If the
manufacturing sector has enough power, however, it may lobby effectively
for flexible exchange rate regimes.
27
The incorporation of debt, combined with a measure of the interests of the
oil sector or the lobby power of the manufacturing sector, significantly
increases the predictive power of the exchange rate models under all three
model classifications, not only for MENA economies, but for economies
overall.  The improvement in predictive power of these augmented models in
explaining MENA’s exchange rate arrangements is substantial, especially so


























































































(b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Model 1                        Model 2                         Model 3Following Edwards (1989), we assume that in the long-term an increase
in the investment rate results in an augmentation in the demand and in the
relative price of non-tradables, thus appreciating the real exchange rate.
This assumption implies, however, that investment is predominantly
constituted of non-tradable products (such as for example services and
construction) and non of tradable goods (such as equipment).  It can also be
due to the multiplier effect of the investment which increases the aggregated
demand of non-tradable products principally. Conversely, the RER is
positively affected by trade restrictions, of which the ratio of imports plus
exports to GDP is a proxy.  The impact of the terms of trade on the RER is
more ambiguous, since there are two opposite effects:  an increase in the
relative price of export goods to import goods leads to an appreciation of the
RER if the income effect, which results in higher demand for non-tradables,
dominates the substitution effect, associated with a decline in the relative
cost of imported intermediate goods used in the production process of non-
tradables.  Finally, an increase in capital inflows, either officially or not,
involves stronger demand for both tradable and non tradable goods. They,
therefore, lead to a higher relative price of non tradables, and conversely
appreciate the RER—as needed for domestic resources to be diverted toward
production in the non tradable sector to meet increased demand. 
A complementary equation has been estimated in order to take more into
consideration the characteristics of some MENA countries.  The idea is that
in a certain number of countries, among which is Egypt, the debt relief
should have led to an appreciation of the ERER.  For this purpose we have
added to equation (1) the ratio of the debt service to total external trade
(imports + exports, DebtServ). 
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Annex 1:  Calculating RER Misalignment
Modeling the Long-Run Equilibrium of the RER
The long-run equation explaining the RER behaviour is based on Edwards
(1994), who has developed a dynamic model of RER determination for a
small, open economy with a single nominal exchange rate system.  The
model allows for both real and nominal factors to play a role in the short run.
In the long run, only real factors— “fundamental”—influence the ERER. In
our case, the long run relation is specified as follows:
i
(1)
ln(et) = c +a1. ln(Invt) + a2. ln(Opent) + a3. ln(TOTt) + a4. Capinft +   t. 
with:
(i) et = RER. This indicator is used as a proxy of the ratio of the price of
non-tradable goods (PDt) to the price of tradable goods (Pwt,Et0, Et, being
the nominal ER in local currency/US$ and Pwt the world prices)
(ii) Invt = Investment ratio to GDP
(iii) Opent = Indicator of trade openness, measured as the sum of import
and export divided by GDP
(iv) TOTt = External terms of trade, measured as the ratio of export to
import prices (in dollars)
(v) Capinft = capital inflows calculated as the net change in reserves
minus the trade balance scaled by GDP
ii
c = intercept, a1 to a4 =parameters, t = time index and   t = error term
28Estimated relationships between RER and its fundamentals are
consistent with theory:  an increase in investment and in capital income, or
an improvement of the terms of trade result in a RER appreciation, which
indicates, in the latter case, that the income effect dominates the substitution
effect. Conversely, the opening of the economy and the increase in the debt
service lead to an RER depreciation. 
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(2)
ln(et) = c +a1. ln(Invt) + a2. ln(Opent) + a3. ln(TOTt) + a4. Capinft + a5.
ln(DebtServt) +   t. 
The existence of these long-term relationships implies that variables of
equations (1) and (2) are cointegrated. It is therefore required to determine
the order of integration of the series. Table A2 in Annex 2 provides the
results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of the data for our
sample of 53 countries over 1970–80 (depending on the countries) to 1997.
We  used the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) methodology, which provides
critical values of ADF tests in the case of heterogeneous panel data. The
results indicate that the series are stationary at either the 1% or 5% levels,
which allowed us to run equations (1) and (2). We then used the Engel and
Granger (1991) method to test for cointegration between the variables of
equations (1) and (2). Cointegration tests have been based on the residuals
of the two equations.  ADF tests conclude, still using  Im, Pesaran, and Shin
(2003) critical values, that residuals are stationary. 
Hence, equations (1) and (2) describe the long-run relationship between
RER and a number of fundamental variables. The equations were estimated
on an unbalanced panel of 53 countries, among which 19 are African
countries (8 CFA and 11 non CFA), 13 Latin America countries, 10 Asian
countries, 10 MENA countries, plus one country  (see Annex 2 for the list of
countries).
iii The results of the regressions–using the White estimator to
correct for the heteroscedasticity bias–are presented in Table A1. The
equations were estimated by using the fixed effect methodology.
iv The
estimated regressions explain a fairly large amount of the observed variation
of the RER. 
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NOTE:  Student t statistics are within brackets. The number of observations used in eq (1) and (2) are respectively 1183 and 1062.  
Data have been compiled from WDI, GDF, GDN and LDB World Bank databases. 
Source: Authors’estimations
Variable                     Eq (1)                Eq (2)the RER from the ERER. 
i  The short run dynamic of the RER has also been estimated through an error correction model.
ii An increase in net capital inflows may result from a) an autonomous augmentation in foreign aid, foreign
voluntary lending or FDI, b) an increase in borrowing due to the removal of domestic capital controls, c) a
fall in the world interest rates, or d) an increase in public borrowing to finance the fiscal deficit. 
iii The countries have been selected on the criteria of their level of income per capita. To preserve a kind of
coherence of the sample, we have chosen, most of the time, intermediate income countries in order to be
comparable to the ones of the MENA region. 
iv This is supported by the data as shown by the Fischer test of equality of intercepts across countries and
preferable to the random effect methodology, as revealed by the value of the Haussmann test.
v In the rest of the document, it is equation (2) that has be used to calculate the misalignment. 
vi Other trials consisting in an “economic” determination of these “sustainable” levels, inspired by Edwards
(1989), which consists, for example, of taking as sustainable value for OPENNESS the average of the three
higher values of the variable, or in the case of capital inflows, zero if the rate of growth of the economy is
inferior to the international interest rate, which means in this case that that borrowing is not sustainable
and did not give better results as far as misalignment is concerned. They are not presented here.
Our calculations of misalignment appear, however, in some cases, to underestimate the level of
misalignment as generally perceived in the different countries.  We thereby have adjusted our estimates by
scaling them up, according to the difference between our calculations of ERER and its level in periods in
which the actual RER was considered to be at the equilibrium. The RER was considered to be close to its
equilibrium in periods following devaluations and structural adjustment where balance of payment was
also close to the equilibrium.  For example, it has been considered that RER equilibrium took place in 1989
in the case of Morocco. This period has been 1991 and 1994–95 for Algeria; 1993–94 for Egypt; 1995 for Iran;
1992 for Jordan; 1980, 1994 and 1997 for Tunisia.  
Some more sophisticated calculations consist, when a variable has a unit root, in using time series
techniques introduced by Beveridge and Nelson (1981) where variables are decomposed into a random walk
with a drift and a stationary component. This technique allows, unlike the trend stationary model based
decomposition, the steady state growth path of the series to shift over time. Fluctuations around the
shifting permanent path reflect cyclical effects. 
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Calculating RER Misalignment
RER misalignment is measured as the ratio of the RER and its equilibrium
value (ERER): 
MIS = (RER/ERER)
Thus, when the RER is higher than its equilibrium value (when the
currency is overvalued) misalignment takes a value greater than one.  But
when the RER is lower than its equilibrium value (undervalued), misalignment
takes a value less than one. 
The estimations of the long-term relationship between the RER and its
fundamental determinants have been used to compute the ERER.
v To this
purpose, the “sustainable” or “equilibrium” values of the fundamental variables had
to be assessed. The idea is that the deviation of the fundamental variables
from their “equilibrium”—in addition to the variations of the short-term
economic policy variables—leads to a misalignment of the RER. The
“permanent” values of the four fundamental variables, i.e., Invt, Opent, TOTt,
Capinft, were computed using moving averages of the series over a three-
year period. This simple method was possible because our series was
stationary.
vi
Following this methodology, excessive trade protection, unexpected
appreciation of the terms of trade or increase in investment and capital
flows, in comparison to the “normal” or long-term trend in the economy, lead
to an overvaluation of the RER.  It can also be shown from the estimation of
the error correction model that in the short run  nominal devaluations (Dev),
black market premium (BMP) and inflation (Infl) explain the deviations of
32Annex 3: Modeling Exchange Rate Choice
In this paper, we empirically tested the hypothesis that for each economy,
the public sector’s determination of exchange rate regime is a decision-making
process which weighs three factors:  the overall structural characteristics of
the economy, its personal interests in minimizing its current external
debt payments and maximizing natural resources revenue (both better
achieved under fixed exchange rates), and the degree to which lobby pressures
by the manufacturing sector can sway the public sector.  The greater the
lobby power of the manufacturing sector, the more likely the public sector
will be to adopt a floating exchange rate regime.  
A central problem throughout the literature in the testing of models of
exchange rate regime choice has been the utilization of de jure (legal) exchange
rate regimes.  Most empirical analysis has used the published exchange rate
regimes from the IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions:
Annual Report.  The report classifies economies according to their exchange
rate arrangement into three broad groups: (a) those whose currency is
pegged to a single currency or currency composite; (b) those whose exchange
rate system has limited flexibility, in terms of a single currency or group of
currencies; and, (c) those with more flexible exchange rate systems.
Unfortunately, in many countries, exchange rates that are officially flexible
have been subject to considerable official “management.”  Indeed, as Calvo
and Reinhart (2002) and others have emphasized, many countries that claim
to have floating exchange rates do not in practice allow the rate to float
freely, but use interest rate and intervention policies to affect its behavior.
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Annex 2: List of Countries in Estimations of Exports/GDP
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MENA                                      AFRICA                             ASIA                     LATIN AMERICA  
CFA            NonCFA
Table A2: List of Countries in Estimations of Exports/GDPSeveral control variables suggested by the literature were also included
in our analysis.  One, capital controls (CAPCONT) is suggested in the
literature on capital liberalization and financial openness, with countries
with capital controls more likely to have fixed exchange rates.  If a
government controls the movement of international capital, it can insulate
itself from the international price movements and will be more able to
maintain a pegged regime.
vi A dummy variable was included if the country
in question had controls on the international movement of capital, and the data
was assembled from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions.
An additional control variable suggested by the political economy
literature (Edwards, 1996) is the historical rate of inflation.  Theory would
predict that countries with a history of rapid inflation would have a lower
probability of maintaining a pegged regime, and would thus tend to favor the
adoption of a more flexible system.  In most other studies, the history of
inflation is measured as the average rate of inflation for some period prior
to the observation year.  We constructed a slightly different index, INFLAT.
This was constructed by taking the average rate of inflation over the five-
year period prior to the observation year, and determining the proportion of
years in which inflation exceeded 30%.  This was meant to better capture the
variable which decision-makers might consider important in determining
their exchange rate regime.
vi One might question whether a policy-maker
makes a serious distinction between whether his economy experienced
average inflation rates of 140% a year versus 100% a year.  Even taking logs
of past inflation rates would retain these ordinal differences in inflation
rate, which from the point of view of a policy-maker may lose their
significance at some level of inflation.  On the other hand, the past
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Within the approaches pioneered by Holden, Holden, and Suss (1979) to
characterize the de facto exchange rate regimes economies employ, a major
contribution was provided by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001),
hereafter LYS, who developed a database of exchange rate classifications by
looking at the actual behavior of the main relevant variables, as opposed to
the traditional classification compiled by the IMF.  The LYS classification is
based on three variables closely related to exchange rate behavior to determine
the de facto exchange rate regime:  exchange rate volatility, volatility of
exchange rate changes, and volatility of reserves.
vi The empirical results
from this paper were based on the original re-classification of exchange rates
by LYS for their 2000 paper.  That dataset has recently been amended, and
the results from this paper will have to be revised.
Structural variables in the analysis include many of the variables
suggested by the optimal currency areas (OCA) literature.  Two of these are
the country size and the degree of openness of the economy, with the
expectation that smaller countries that are more open tend to favor fixed
exchange rate regimes.  In our estimations, size (SIZE) is measured by the
log of GDP, relative to the United States, lagged one period, and openness
(OPEN) is defined as the average share of exports to GDP for the five-year
period prior to the observation year.  In addition, the OCA literature would
suggest that vulnerability of an economy’s output to shocks affects its choice
of exchange rate regime.  Thus, we have included two indices for the extent
of external and domestic shock variability.  The first, CVEX, is the coefficient
of variation of real exports for the five-year period prior to the observation
year.  Likewise, CVGDP was constructed as the coefficient of variation of
real GDP for the five-year period prior to the observation year.  Each of these
indicators was assembled from World Bank data. 
36sectors as a share of total world imports from the economy in question.
Our estimations were performed over the 1985–1999 time period.  
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probability of the economy facing episodes of high or runaway inflation
(above 20% a year, in our estimations) may play a serious role in
considerations for exchange rate policy in the future.  
In addition to these variables, we have incorporated variables that proxy
the public sector’s weight put on personal interests (in minimizing external
debt payments and maximizing natural resource export revenue) versus its
ability to be lobbied by the manufacturing sector.  For the reasons given
above, countries which have higher levels of external debt will have a
greater tendency to opt for a fixed exchange rate regime over a floating one,
since there is an economic pay-off to allowing the currency to become
overvalued, in terms of lower foreign-currency debt payments.  In our
estimations, we included PUBXDEBT, which is the lagged value of public
and publicly guaranteed external debt to GDP. 
To measure the public sector’s interest in petroleum revenues, we include
the size of the petroleum sector (measured by its share of total exports),
OILX, to measure the public sector’s personal exporting interests, again
lagged one period, and assembled using World Bank data.  Lobby power in
the manufacturing sector, MANLOBBY, is measured as an interactive
between the share of manufacturing exports in GDP and the concentration
of manufacturing exports among the top three products, constructed using
data from the United Nation’s COMTRADE (which allows for analysis of
trade-by-commodity).  Like the size of the petroleum sector in exports, the
manufacturing lobby variable was lagged one period.  Because of significant
reporting errors on the part of some economies (particularly the GCC)
vi in
terms of exports, exports of oil, exports of manufacturing goods, and total
exports (to determine shares in total exports) by each economy were re-
computed by aggregating world imports from each economy in the various
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